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Abstract: An important question for the development of the East German labour
market in the transition to a market economy is whether wage differentials by
qualification, industry or region which were relatively small in the former GDR adjust
to those in market economies which are more in line with differences in productivities
and economic conditions. We estimate empirical earnings functions to quantify the
contribution of various important factors shaping the earnings distribution in the East
German transition process. Estimation is based on the first six waves of the Labour
Market Monitor which is a representative panel data set of the East German working-
age population covering the period 1990 to 1992. The specification of the estimated
earnings functions is motivated by the various hypotheses of the development of the
East German wage structure in the transformation process. Although we do find
some similiarities with the existing wage structure in West Germany, the East German
wage structure still differs in some important dimensions.
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this paper. The second author would also like to acknowledge financial support from the German
Science Foundation (Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft) under the project "Arbeitsmarkdynamik,
individuelles Erwerbsverhalten und Einkommensentwicklung im TransformationsprozeB".1 Introduction
The excessive increase of East German wages is seen by many observers as the main
culprit for the dramatic employment decline and the unprecedented increase in
unemployment in the transition process to a market economy (Akerlof et aI, 1991;
Sinn / Sinn, 1992; Siebert, 1992). Soon at the beginning of the transition process, in
most industries collectively bargained wages were set to reach parity with West
German levels in 1994. Actual wage settlements were not related to economic
,conditions and productivity developments, but simple were set to catch-up to this pre-
specified target (surveys of East German labour market developments are provided in
Franz, 1992, 1993). The resulting employment losses were either viewed as inevitable
by those who saw the future of the East German economy in a high productivity, high
wage strategy or not related to wages at all, a view held publicly by West German
union leaders who, at least in the beginning, dominated the collective bargaining
process. Another important argument for a quick catch-up of eastern wages, popular
among politicians and union leaders alike, was that otherwise East Germans would
migrate to the west at a grand scale and congest already crowded labour and housing
markets. However, with sky-rocketing unemployment and the virtual breakdown of
manufacturing industries the recognition of economic realities have in the end reached
the bargaining table. A speedy catching-up of wages to West German levels is still on
the agenda, but the deadline for wage equalization has now been set for 1996.
Aside from the hotly debated issues of catching-up of wages and the equalization of
living standards in united Germany, an important question is whether wages are
sufficiently differentiated by qualification, industry or region to account for differences
in productivities and economic conditions in East Germany. Conventional wisdom
holds that, due to socialist ideology, there was little wage differentiation in the former
GDR, and that the development to a market economy necessitates profound changes in
the wage structure corresponding to changes in the relative demand for skills brought
about by the restructuring process in the East German economy. It is also
conventional wisdom that collective bargaining agreements have not allowed for this
necessary adjustment of wages (see, e.g., Siebert, 1992:124-128; SachversHindigenrat,
1993:235-236).
However, as concerned statements of representatives of both unions and employers'
organizations suggest, these centralized agreements often were not enforceable at the
firm level and wages might well be more sensitive to economic conditions of single
firms in the present East German situation than it has usually been the case under
"normal" circumstances in West Germany. Reasons for this apparently new
development in German industrial relations include concession bargaining at the firm
level and the fact that incumbent firms have been leaving or new firms have not been
joining employers' unions at an unprecedented scale. Facing these developments and
ever rising unemployment the collective bargaining parties in the end agreed to allow
effective wages at the firm level to be set below the contract wage under certain
circumstances specified in special "emergency" provisions known as "Offnungs-
klauseln". It therefore seems not obvious a priori that the wage structure in East
Germany is in fact rigid and thus hinders the transition process to a market economy.
Nor is there much empirical evidence on the existence and relative size of wage
differentials by qualification, firm and industry characteristics or region.This paper contributes to an evaluation of this and related issues. In particular, we
focus on the factors influencing the East German wage structure and on the question
on whether the emerging wage structure corresponds to that observed in other market
economies, especially in West Germany. To this end, we estimate earnings equations
based on a rich panel data set for the East German labour market covering the first two
years of the transition process. The paper is set up as follows. In section 2, we discuss
various hypotheses on the development of the East German wage structure in the
transition process which form the basis for the specification of the earnings equations,
described in section 3. Estimation results from these earnings equations are
summarized and discussed in section 4, and section 5 contains ourconclusions.
2 Factors Influencing the East German Wage Structure
There are various hypotheses which try to explain the development of the East German
wage structure in the transformation process. These hypotheses, which motivate the
specification of the earnings equation in section 3, are briefly summarized below with
special reference to their implications for the structure ofwages.
IndustryShifts and Restructuring
The process of "de-industrialization" in East Germany on the one hand, the
modernisation of the infrastructure, the improvement of housing quality as well as the
increased demand for services by firms and households lacking before the regime
switch on the other hand have led to shifts in labour demand both within and between
manufacturing and service industries. In addition, the relative to other countries very
high employment share in farming has sharply decreased since unification. These
changes were brought about by the virtual breakdown of trade with the former trading
partners, for which there were several reasons: break-up of the former COMECON
trading system, quadrupling of the exchange rate in the wake of the currency union and
huge wage increases since then.
In a competitive labour market these 'demand shifts would lead to some increase in
search unemployment and to changes in relative wages. In East Germany,
employment adjustments through wage flexibility was severely restricted by the
dominance of union-dominated collective bargaining and institutional regulations (see
below). Nevertheless, we would expect some downward wage pressure in those
industries where product demand virtually broke down after monetary union. In view
of sky-rocketing unemployment, unions agreed to delay the process of catching-up to
West German wage levels by 1994 and, due to the realities at the level of individual
firms, wage drift became negative in some industries. There is also some evidence
(Geib et aI., 1992) that the level of effective wages has been below contract wages in
certain segments ofthe East German labour market.
2Hence, in industries with expanding demand and little exposure to competition from
trade with West German and international firms, like construction and services, we
would expect positive wage differentials relative to industries heavily exposed to
competition, expecially manufacturing. Since the regional concentration of certain
industries was very high in the former GDR, we also expect demand shifts to affect
regional wage differentials.
Wage bargaining
The literature on wage determination in East Germany has usually stressed the
importance of collective bargaining between monopoly unions and employers'
associations (see, e.g., Franz, 1991; Burda / Funke, 1993, Paque, 1993). Put simply,
the story here is the following: In the beginning of the transformation process, the
bargaining process was a one-sided game. The employer side was not adequately
represented at the collective bargaining table since it was represented by either former
managers of state owned firms or by representatives of West German firms who had
little incentive to fight for low wages in East German firms, their prospective
competitors in national and international markets. On the other hand, the old trade
union, the Freie Deutsche Gewerkschaftsbund, was discredited by its collaborative
behaviour under the old regime. Consequently, its West German counterpart, the
"Deutsche Gewerkschaftsbund", which acts as the umbrella organization for sixteen
constituent industrial unions, was able to move into this virgin territority and organize
workers with impressive ease. It was recognized by East German employers as the de
facto negotiating partner in collective bargaining and was thereby able to conclude
wage agreements in almost every industrial sector, in the public sector and some of the
service industries.
Given the fact that union organization was particularly successful in the manufacturing
sector, where the powerful and determined IG Metall, the former West German union
representing a large fraction of all employees in manufacturing, was leading wage
negotiations, we would expect particularly strong wage effects in this sector. Another
important role has been played by the Treuhandanstalt, the public agency in charge of
privatizing state-owned firms, which had to deal with political pressure to financially
support large industrial enterprises, especially in the manufacturing sector (to save the
"industrial core" of East Germany). This has probably also led to relatively high wage
increases in manufacturing. However, since this sector was particularly hard hit by
employment reductions caused by demand side factors, these effects are expected to
be mitigated to some extent by concession bargaining at the firm level, growth in the
number of firms not belonging tl:? an employers organization and the application of
special"emergency" provisions ("Offnungsklauseln").
Related to both the industry shift and the wage bargaining hypotheses is the end-game
interpretation of the wage bargaining process in declining industries, as discussed by
Lawrence / Lawrence (1985) for the U.S. in the eighties and proposed by, inter alia,
Franz (1992) as an explanation for wage determination in East Germany. This
hypothesis tries to explain why workers in declining industries may manage to raise
their wages relative to those of workers in other industries, despite suffering a relative
decline in product demand and in the derived demand for labour. The long-run
elasticity of the demand for labour depends on the responsiveness of both the level of
investment to wages, and the capital intensity of new investment to wages. In an end
3game situation, where an industry is clearly dying, investment will be low whatever the
level of wages since firms already have more capital than needed. In this case, the
elasticity of demand for labour is low and the trade union has an incentive to raise
wages and appropriate the quasi rents of the firms. This reasoning obviously depends
on a low wage elasticity of labour demand, on which the evidence is mixed (see
Akerlof et a1. 1991; Burda/ Funke, 1993; Licht / Steiner 1994).
Another important dimension of the wage structure is the regional differentiation of
wages, e.g. by states (Lander), which is also expected to be heavily influenced by
centralized wage bargaining. As itis well known, regional wage differentials in West
Germany have remained suspiciously stable over decades despite of fundamental
changes in economic conditions in the Lander. The rigidity of the regional wage
structure has been attributed by some observers (see, e.g., Paque, 1993) to the
"principle of equal pay for equal work", a principle which has also featured
prominently in political rhetoric on living conditions in Germany after unification.
Since the institutional setting of wage bargaining in West Germany has been
transferred to the east, we would expect regional wage differentials to be unimportant
if industrial structure is taken into account
Efficiency wages
Several variants of efficiency wage theory argue that a firm's strategy to cut wages
relative to other firms might in fact increase labour costs measured in efficiency units.
One popular variant of this theory is based on the argument of "fairness" or "equity"
(Akerlof / Yellen, 1990). It implies that employees compare their wages to some
reference group performing a similiar task and adjust their work effort if they see, in
their subjective assessment, a discrepancy between effort and remuneration. In the
present context, this hypothesis could be relevant in the case of newly founded firms in
Eastern Germany, many of which are owned by western companies. Since employees
in eastern establishments of western firms might compare their remuneration with their
western collegues performing the same task in the same company, firms may have to
pay efficiency wages to secure an efficient level of work effort. A positive wage
differential in newly established firms would therefore be compatible with this variant
of efficiency wage theory. However, it would also not be in conflict with more
orthodox explanations of wage determination. e.g. higher capital intensity and, hence,
labour productivity in these firms.
Other variants of efficiency wage theory relate to the avoidance of adverse selection,
job turnover and shirking by means of a high wage strategy. Th,e most popular of
these hypotheses is the shirking variant of the efficiency wage theory which points out
that, given costly and imperfect monitoring of effort, firms offer above-average wages
as an incentive to their employees to avoid shirking. Since monitoring effort tends to'
be more difficult in larger firms, this hypothesis offers an explanation of the firm-size
wage differentials often observed in market economies (see. e.g., Katz, 1986, for a
survey of efficiency wage theory). An alternative explanation would be that larger
firms employ more qualified workers and have therefore to pay higher wages. Hence,
an interpretation of a positive correlation between wages and firm size in terms of the
shirking hypothesis (or any other variant of efficiency wage theory) would at least
require that qualification be taken into account.
4Human Capital
In contrast to its obsolete physical capital stock, East Gennany is generally considered
to be well endowed with human capital. In 1990, more than 50 percent of all East
Gennan employees had completed apprenticeship training, compared to 60 percent in
West Gennany, and only 10 percent had no vocational training, compared to about 20
percent of all West Gennan employees. Furthennore, almost one in four of all East
Gennan employees had completed a technical college ("Fachschule"), whereas in West
Gennany the percentage of employees with a similar vocational qualification was only
about eight percent. Adding this latter group and those with university education, the
share of employees with higher vocational eduaction in East and West Gennany is
quite similar -- 11 and 12 percent, respectively. A noteworthy difference in vocational
attainment between the fonner GDR and West Gennany is the much higher share of
women with technical college education in Ea~t Gennany which, at the beginning of
the transition process, was seven times as high as in West Gennany (Bielenski /
Magvas / Pannentier, 1992:148).
Conventional wisdom holds that there was little wage differentiation by skill in the
fonner GDR. However, although there is some evidence that the East Gennan wage
structure was indeed more compressed than in West Gennany (Krueger / Pischke,
1992), wage differentials due to educational attainment seem to have been more or less
of similar magnitude (Krueger / Pischke, 1992; but see Schwarze, 1991 and Bird /
Schwarze / Wagner, 1994 for somewhat different results). There is also some
evidence that experience-earnings profiles in the fonner GDR were much flatter than
in West Gennany (Schwarze, 1991; Krueger / Pischke, 1992; Bird / Schwarze /
Wagner, 1994).
Due to new production processes and profound changes in the organization of work,
the value of labour market experience accumulated in the fonner socialist economy of
the GDR will depreciate in the transition process to a market economy. We would
therefore expect rather flat experience/earnings profiles when looking at the East
Gennan wage structure after unification, an expectation which seems to be supported
by some empirical evidence (Krueger / Pischke, 1992; Bird / Schwarze / Wagner,
1994). There is also some evidence that the restructuring process of the East Gennan
economy has been accompanied by "dequalification" of part of the labour force, where
employees with higher vocational qualification seem to have been affected most. In
particular, survey results for 1991 show that a significantly higher proportion of them
had jobs which, in their opinion, required less vocational qualification than the jobs
they had at the beginning of the transition process. 01) the other hand, employees with
completed apprenticeship training ("Facharbeiter") seem to be better equipped to cope
with changing skill requirements in this process; on average, they reported little change
in this respect (Bielenski / Magvas / Pannentier, 1992:151).
Otherlabour supplyfactors
Several other labour supply factors may have affected the wage structure in the East
Gennan transition process. These include the very high female labour force
participation rate, early retirement schemes and short-time work as widespread means
ofemployment adjustment, and migration and commuting to West Gennany.
5Since unification, employment of women has dropped sharply and female
unemployment, especially long-term unemployment, has increased correspondingly,
while there seems to have been little downward-pressure on wages and only a modest
decline in the female labour force participation rate. However, taking into account that
those who lost or voluntarily left their job rationally collect unemployment benefits for
some time before they withdraw from the labour market, "effective" female labour
force participation in East Germany may be much lower now than the statistics show.l
Due to their high level of formal education, the easy availabiltiy of child-care facilities,
but also socialist ideology supported by good career prospects and the tax system,
female labour force participation in the former GDR was one of the highest in the
world. Since some of these factors have changed in the transition process, in
particular child-care facidities are no longer provided by firms and those provided by
communities or private institutions are either rationed or expensive, we would expect
that only those women with a relatively high market wage remain in the labour force.
As it is well known from the labour economics literature, this "self-selection" of
individuals in particular labour force states may have important effects on the wage
structure.
In addition to short-time work, early retirement was the other quantitatively important
means of emploYment adjustment in the first stage of the East German transition
process (Licht / Steiner, 1994). Given that the reduction and restructuring of employ-
ment on a grand scale with the reduction of accumulated human capital especially
among the older age groups was widely considered inevitable, early retirement,
depending on certain age limits either directly or after an extended unemployment
spell, was seen as the easiest adjustment policy which also made room for younger
employees. Since elderly employees who did not take advantage of this option are
most likely a very special group with a high market wage, selectivitY effects are also
expected to important with respect to age.
Another labour supply factor which may have affected the East German wage structure
are migrants and commuters to West Germany because they are supposed to comprise
persons with certain characteristics giving rise to still another selectivity-effect. The
large flows of migrants to West Germany at the beginning of the transition process and
the persistently high number of commuters aroused much concern among politicians
and the East German public that they were loosing the more qualified and motivated
part of the workforce to West Gemany. However, Pischke / Staat / Vogele (1994)
analyze potential determinants for migration and commuting to West Germany and do
not find conclusive evidence for the hypothesis that commuters are a self-selected
group ofemployees.
3 Empirical Earnings-Functions
In the following empirical analysis we try to quantify the relative importance of the
factors discussed in the previous section in shaping the Eastern German wage
structure. To this end we estimate generalized earnings functions with the log of
earnings as the dependent variable and a set of explanatory variables related to the
1 There is some evidence for this hypothesis which shows that the conditional re-employment
probabilitity -- the hazard rate from unemployment -- for married females with small children is
relatively low (see Steiner, 1993).
6hypotheses developed in the previous section. Our specification of the earnings
function differs in several aspects from that in previous studies. First, in contrast to
other authors (Schwarze, 1991; Bird / Schwarze / Wagner, 1994) we do not consider a
strict human capital interpretation of the earnings equation appropriate for describing
the wage structure in East Germany. We rather follow a more eclectic approach and
include a richer set of explanatory variables in the earnings equation which allows us
to interpret the various hypotheses summarized in section 2 within this empirical tool.
Second, estimation is based on a large panel data set for the East German labour
market -- the "Labour Market Monitor". Third, in contrast to previous empirical
studies which have been mostly based on cross-sectional analysis we take advantage
of the panel structure of our data base, i.e. repeated observations on the same
individuals, and also try to correct of sample-selectivity bias in the earnings equations.
The data come from the first six waves of the Labour Market Monitor (LMM)
commissioned by the Institut fUr Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung (Institute for
Employment Research, IER, the research institute of the Federal Labor Office). The
IER-LMM is a 0.1 per cent random sample of the former GDR resident population
(including East-Berlin). In the first survey in November 1990, about 10,000
individuals born between 1926 and 1974 were interviewed The respondents were re-
interviewed in March, July and November 1991 as well as in July and November
1992. In the fourth wave, addtional individuals born in 1975 were included in the
survey to maintain the lower age limit in the sample. For a general description of the
IER-LLM see Bielenski / Magvas / Parmentier (1992).
The availabilty of panel data enables us to take into account for individual effects in
the earnings equation. These individual effects should account for all time-invariant
unobservable factors which may affect earnings, usually interpreted as unobserved
abilities in the literature. In addition, the panel structure of the data set also allows us
to model unobserved time effects. Estimation of the earnings equation can either
condition on these individual effects (fixed-effects) or treat them as random. The
random-effects estimator is based on the assumption that the individual effects are
uncorrelated with the explanatory variables in the model and makes use of both the
time and cross-section variation in the data, whereas the fixed-effects estimator only
uses the former information. Given our relatively short observation period, most of the
variation in the explanatory variables included in the earnings equation is cross-
sectional rather than in the time domain. Since the fixed-effects estimator would
therefore yield rather imprecise parameter estimates, we will base our analysis on the
random-effects model with respect to the individual effects. We also include time
dummies to control for time-varying effects affecting all individuals alike, such as
macroeconomic factors or changes in institu~ional regulations.
Given this specification, the parameters of the earnings equation and the error
components can be estimated by generalized (weighted) least sq~ares (see, e.g.,
Greene, 1993, chapter 16; Hsiao, 1986, section 3.3). Since sample attrition is quite
important in this data set (see Bielenski / Magvas / Parmentier, 1992) we account for it
by adopting a straightforward extension of the standard random-effects estimator to the
situation of an unbalanced panel design (unequal number of observations per person),
assuming that attrition occurs at random (see, e.g., Hsiao, 1986: 194-197).
7One complication when estimating this model arises from the well-known potential
sample-selectivity bias in earnings equations. Within the observation period November
1990 to November 1992, about 75 percent of all males and 64 percent of all females
included in the sample have been employed on average, while there has been a
dramatic fall in the employment ratio both for males and females. The possibility that
an individual's employment propensity is correlated with his or her earnings, given his
or her observable characteristics, seems likely a priori. To account for the resulting
potential sample-selectivity bias, we follow the usual two-stage procedure by including,
the inverse Mills Ratio as additional right-hand side variable in the earnings equation.
As usual, this selectivity-bias correction term is obtained from pooled reduced-form
probit employment equations (this standard procedure is described in Greene, 1993:
708-713, for example).
Since we do not want to exclude a priori the possibility that the effects of some or all
of the explanatory variables in the earnings and employment equations differ between
males and females, the sample is split by gender and these functions are estimated
separately for males and females. Table 1 contains definitions of the variables and
their sample means in the estimated earnings equations.
The number of individuals refers to East German residents (including Berlin-East)
aged 16 to 65 years working in East Germany; commuters to West Germany are thus
not included in the sample. We also exclude employees on (apprenticeship) training
schemes from the sample. The number of observations refer to cases with valid
information for all variables included in the earnings equation as well as in the
employment equation used to calculate the sample-selectivity term.
Our data base contains information on an individual's monthly net wage in each wave
of the panel, but does unfortunately not give information on the gross wage which
would obviously be more relevant for the present analysis. To account for the effects
ofmarital status and children on the wedge between the gross and net wage we include
these variables as control variables in the estimated earnings equations. This is an
admittedly rather rough way to acount for the subtleties of the tax system taken over
from West Germany, but to impute gross wages from the information contained in our
data base seems hardly feasible and would be, in any case, well beyond the scope of
this paper. -
8Table 1 Definition ofvariables and sample means in earnings equations.
Variable name Males Females
Real net monthly wage 1325.25 1054.81
In real net monthly wa~e 7.13 6.89
Householdstructure
Number ofchildren 0.63 0.68
Married 0.74 0.72
Age (in years) 42.21 41.53
A~e squared / 100 19.52 18.95
Educational requirementforjob (skilled) 1)
No qualification 0.13 0.13
Highly skilled 0.09 0.02
Graduate degree 0.24 0.32
Short-time work 0.18 0.16
New firm 0.11 0.11
Firm size (less than 29 employees) 1)
20 - 200 employees 0.35 0.40
200 - 2000 employees 0.36 0.29
more than 2000 employees 0.12 0.08
Industry (Metal manufacturing) 1)
Agriculture 0.08 0.06
Mining, Energy 0.07 0.03
Construction 0.15 0.03
Other Manufacturing 0.12 0.11
Trade 0.07 0.15
Public Transport 0.10 0.05
Banking, Insurance 0.01 0.03
Other Services 0.17 0.44




Sachsen-Anhalt - 0.18 0.17
Thiiringen 0.17 0.16
Berlin-East 0.07 0.08
Wave (November 1990) l'
March 1991 0.18 0.18
July 1991 0.16 0.17
November 1991 0.16 0.15
July 1992 0.14 0.14
November 1992 0.13 0.13
Inverse Mills Ratio -0.35 -0.49
# Individuals ~) 4027 3147
# Observations 2) 11170 8775
Notes: 1) The base category is given in parantheses. 2) In the earnings equation, the number of
individuals (observations) refers to those employed at the date of interview in November 1990 for
whom information on all variables included in the estimation is available.
Source: IER-Labour Market Monitor, waves 1 - 6; own calculations.
9Net monthly wages have been converted to real wages deflated by the average
consumer price index as obtained from publications of the Federal Statistical Office.2
The average monthly real wage in the observation period is about 1,300 DM for males
and 1,050 DM for females. These wages refer to all the employed in the sample and
are not standardized by working hours, information on which is only available in the
first wave of the panel. We do, however, have information on whether or not an
employee is on short-time work in each wave. In the East German transition process,
short-time work has been a widely used means to assist the sharp reductions of
employment. The number of short-time workers peaked in the second quarter of 1991
at nearly two million employees with an average working-time of only about 50
percent of standard hours (see Licht / Steiner, 1994). Since then, short-time work has
been sharply reduced and reached a level of some two hundred thousand at the end of
the observation period. We assume that in the observation period differences in
working hours were mainly due to short-time work for which we include a dummy
variable in the earnings equation.
Since labour force interruptions were relatively rare events in the former GDR (--
working was more or less mandatory -- age should be a gcxxl proxy for labour market
experience. Instead of including years of schooling or indicators for educational
attainment as it is usual done in earnings functions based on human capital
considerations, we use indicators for the skill requirements of an individual's job to
account for specific human capital since this seems to us more relevant for answering
the questions raised in the previous section. In the base category we include those
with completed apprenticeship training ("Facharbeiter") or similar vocational
qualification ("Teilfacharbeiter").
Following the discussion in section 2, we include firm characteristics (new firm, firm
size) as well as industry and regional dummies as explanatory variables in the earnings
equations to account for potential effects of industrial restructuring, collective
bargaining and efficiency wage considerations on the wage structure. In --addition, we
also include a dummy for the public sector where wage determination is somewhat
peculiar.
As explained above, we also include time dummies to account for the effect of changes
in general labour market conditions and institutional regulations as far as they are not
accounted for by the explanatory variables in the model.
4 Estimation Results
In Table 2 we report estimation results for the earnings funbtions for males and
females from the random-effects model including the selectivity-correction term
derived from the first-stage reduced-form probit employment equations in Table Al in
the appendix. Since these reduced-form equations are of little substantive interest in
the present context, their main purpose being to derive the selectivity-correction terms,
we do not comment on estimation results in Table Al here.
2 The price deflator series corresponding to the respective six waves in the period November'1990
to November 1992 is: 0.966, 1.041, 1.067, 1.180, 1.206, and 1.211 (see Statistisches Bundesamt,
Zur wirtschaftlichen und sozialen Lage in den neuen Bundeslandern, Wiesbaden; various issues).
10Starting with the sample-selectivity term, the estimation results in Table 2 show that
the error terms in the earnings and the employment equation are significantly
correlated. Hence, theoretically, earnings equations estimated on a sample of
employed individuals without controlling for sample-selectivity yield inconsistent
parameter estimates of the earnings equations. However, as estimation results without
the selectivity term (not reported here, but available from the authors on request)
show, leaving out this term hardly changes estimation results; the only" noticeable
effect occurred for females where estimated coefficients on the variables age and age
squared turned out somewhat higher in absolute terms.
Turning to the estimated time effects, we find that, ceteris paribus, real net monthly
wages in November 1992 are about 17 (=exp(0.1525) - 1) percent higher for males
and 26 (=exp(0.2327) - 1) percent higher for females than in November 1990. This
large gender difference in the change of real wages may seem surprising at first sight,
but could either be explained by a a self-selection argument if females with
unfavourable market opportunities or a strong preference for home-time have had a
high propensity to become unemployed or to Withdraw from the labour market,
whereas especially the latter option is not so easily available for men, except for early
retirement. This propensity could either be related to observable factors included in
the earnings equation, such as age and household structure, or unobserved factors
related to an individual's employment propensity and correlated with earnings.
However, in the latter case, we would have expected a somewhat stronger impact of
the inclusion of the sample-selectivity term on the estimated coefficients in the
earnings equation for females.
IITable 2. Earnings function estimates (random-effects model)
Dependent variable: In realnet monthly wage
I,· ..
Males Females
Variable 1) Coeff. I t I Coeff. It I
Constant 6.7065 99.05 6.5716 68.16
Married 0.0755 5.62 - 0.0702 4.41
# Children 0.0214 4.17 0.0042 0.62
Age (in Years) 0.0141 3.98 0.0154 2.99
Aft,e squared / 100 - 0.0150 3.36 - 0.0186 2.78
No qualification - 0.0251 3.59 - 0.0517 6.14
Highly skilled 0.0892 9.85 0.0586 3.27
Graduate deft,ree 0.1625 18.93 0.0953 11.75
Short-time work - 0.1046 20.95 - 0.1188 19.35
New firm 0.0093 1.37 0.0256 3.31
20 - 200 employees 0.0103 1.47 0.0274 3.66
200 - 2000 employees 0.0298 3.81 0.0737 8.51
More than 2000 employees 0.0575 5.68 0.1054 8.46
Agriculture - 0.0487 3.83 - 0.0225 1.06
Mining, energy 0.0481 3.37 0.0533 1.98
Construction 0.1041 10.31 0.0680 3.14
Other manufacturing - 0.0128 1.32 - 0.0209 1.28
Trade - 0.0127~ 0.99 - 0.0425 2.64
Public transport 0.0204 1.53 - 0.0169 0.67
Banking, insurance 0.0421 1.41 0.1251 5.14
Other services 0.0208 1.97 0.0116 0.76
Public services - 0.0264 3.93 0.0525 6.99
Mecklenburg-Vorpommem - 0.0126 0.76 0.0411 1.89
Brandenburg 0.0154 1.05 0.0075 0.37
Sachsen-Anhalt - 0.0027 0.19 0.0135 0.69
Thiiringen - 0.0071 0.49 - 0.0098 0.49
Berlin-East 0.0653 3.36 0.1145 4.50
March 1991 - 0.0635 15.24 - 0.0740 15.96
July 1991 - 0.0012 0.25 - 0.0196 3.75
November 1991 - 0.0202 4.05 0.0305 5.54
July 1992 0.0542 9.49 0.1162 17.86
November 1992 0.1525 25.34 0.2327 34.76





# Individuals 4027 3147
# Observations 11170 8775
Notes: 1) For definition and sample means of the variables see Table 1. 2) The first component in
the composite error term 0u = 00. + 08 refers to the time-invariant individual effect, the second
component is a white-noise error term which varies both over time and between individuals.
Source: IER-Labour Market Monitor, waves 1 - 6; own calculations.
12As mentioned above, marital status and the number of children should account for the
effects of the tax system on the wedge between gross and net wages. Whereas for
males the coefficients ofthese variables show the expected signs and are of reasonable
magnitude, estimation results for females suggest that some intervening factors with
respect to these variables are at work. One such factor could be that, on average,
married females may in fact work fewer hours on average than singles whereas we
have assumed that, except for institutionally regulated short-time work, there has been
little variation in individual working hours within the observation period.
Following usual practice, the variable age as a proxy for general labour market
experience is included by a linear and quadratic term in the earnings equations to allow
for the typical concave age/earnings relationship. The estimated coefficients on age
and age squared are relatively low both for males and females compared to most
estimates for West Germany and other market economies. This result is compatible
with previous research by Schwarze (1991), Krueger / Pischke (1992) and Geib et a1.
(1992) based on different data sources and estimation methods.
Estimation results in Table 2 indicate that there is some wage differentiation by skill
level, although compared to western standards they seem quite modest. Compared to
employees in semi-skilled jobs males without qualification earn, ceteris paribus, about
2.5 percent and females in this category earn about 5 percent less. Highly skilled male
(female) employees earn about 9 (6) percent more than those in jobs without
qualifcational requirement. The largest wage differential exists for male employees in
a job requiring a graduate degree, whose wage is, ceteris paribus, about 18 percent
higher than for the reference group.
Employees on short-time work earn, ceteris paribus, about 10 percent less than
someone in full-time employment. Given the institutional regulations which in East
Germany were, at least in the first phase of the transition process, considerably more
generous than in West Germany, the wage effect of short-time work seems of
reasonable magnitude.
Turning to the effects offirm and industry structure on wages, with respect to the "new
firm" dummy we find only weak effects: for females the estimated effect implies that
the wage premium for working in a new firm is about 2.5 percent, for males there is no
statistically significant effect. Since there is really no reason for gender differences
with respect to the "fair wage", the hypothesis referred to in section 2 is not supported
by our estimation results. However, this result could also suggest that there is only a
weak incentive for mobility between old and newly established firms, which could
retard the future restructuring process in East German industry.
Although employment growth in Eastern Germany is concentrated on small and
medium sized firms in construction, trade and services (see Harhoff / Stahl, 1994)
wages are, ceteris paribus, significantly higher in larger firms. Wages of males
working in firms with more than 2,000 employees are about 6 percent higher than in
firms with less than 20 employees; for females this wage differential is more than 11
percent. An explanation for this firm-size effect could be in terms of the shirking
hypothesis referred to in section 2. However, this explanation begs the question why
the firm-size effect is much larger for females. We do not have a plausible explanation
for this gender effect, which has also been detected by Bellmann (1992) in simple
13cross-section estimates on the second wave of this data base, and therefore suspect
that it is due to a selectivity effect which is not accounted for by our estimation
procedure. Gender differences in wage differentials in the public sector, where a
significant negative (positive) wage differential exists for males (females), are also
hard to explain by collective bargaining orefficiency wage ,arguments.
The estimated industry effects are not compatible with any single explanation, such as
pure demand-side or institutional explanations, i.e. the relative strength of union
bargaining. First of all, estimated industry effects differ by gender, which is not easily
explained by these theories. In particular, the wage premium in banking and insurance
relative to metal manufacturing is much higher for females than for m~les, and for the
former is still some 5 percent in public services where it is negative for males. Given
the boom in the construction industry, the positive wage differential in this industry
relative to manufacturing for both males and females is expected, whereas the negative
differentials in trade come as a surprise (for males it is not significant, however). On
the other hand, in view of the dramatic employment reductions which occurred in
agriculture, the relatively small negative wage differential in this sector could indicate
that most of the adjustment in this sector has already occurred. The positive wage
differentials in mining and energy relative to metal manufacturing could be ~xplained
by less exposure to competition from West German and international firms in that
industries.
Given the pecularities of the German centralized bargaining system it is not
particularly surprising that, with the exception of East-Berlin, there is little wage
differentiation by region (Lander). Since unification, East-Berlin forms one single
labour market with West-Berlin and there is naturally a strong tendency for wages to
catch-up with the western level earlier than in otherparts of East Germany. Somewhat
puzzling, however, is the result that this regional effect is much more pronounced for
females than for males. Here, too, we can only appeal to a selecitivity effect which is
not accounted for by ourestimation procedure.
5 Conclusions
Our estimation results give a differentiated picture of the East German wage structure:
(i) After controlling for important explanatory variables, the autonomous wage
increase for females exceeded that for males considerably. This could be due to a
self-selectivity effect if only females with favourable market opportunities
remained in employment. However, our estimation results on the basis of
selectivity-corrected earnings equations cast some doubt on thIS explanation.
(ii) Experience/earnings profiles are very flat which suggests that human capital
accumulated in the former GDR in the form of general labour market experience
has been depreciated to a large extent. It will take a long time before we observe
experience/earnings profiles as steep as for West Germany.
(iii) So far, job-specific skills have been rewarded only modestly in the transition
process. Females in jobs with high skill requirements are rewared less than males
in comparable jobs. Hence, wage differentials for different skill levels may not
14provide enough incentives to acquire the required skills which could hamper the
restructuring process in East Germany.
(iv) Wages in newly established firms are, ceteris paribus, only slighly above those in
incumbent firms. This, too, reduces incentives for mobility from old to newly
established firms, which could retard the future restructuring process in East
German industry.
(v) Wages increase with firm size, which is a result also found in studies for West
Germany and other market economies. However, in East Germany this firm-size
effect is, after controlling for other potential intervening factors, much larger for
females which is not compatible with standard economic explanations.
(vi) Estimated industry wage differentials are not compatible with any single
explanation, such as pure demand-side or institutional explanations, i.e. the
relative strength of union bargaining. The wage,differential is relatively high for
males in the construction industry and for females in banking and insurance.
Demand factors seem to play a role here, but the gender differences remain
unexplained.
(vii) Except for East-Berlin, there is little regional differentiation in wages after
controlling for other factors, which can be explained with the centralized system
of collective bargaining taken over from West Germany and the special situation
of East-Berlin which forms a single labour market with West-Berlin.
15Appendix
The reduced-fonn probit employment equations summarized in the following table are
used to construct the selectivity-correction tenns (the Inverse Mills Ratio) in the
earnings equations in Table 2. Estimation is by maximum likelihood on the pooled
sample of all six waves. The set of explanatory variables in the two equations differ
by the specification of the variables for age and the inclusion of indica!ors for the skill
requirements of an individual's job in the earnings equations and level of education in
the employment equations.
TableAi: Reduced-form probit employment equations· ML estimates
Males Females
Variable 1) Coeff. It I Coeff. I t I
Constant 1.3145 32.65 1.0679 31.05
Age < 20 years - 1.0507 19.04 - 1.]946 23.79
20 < Age::;; 30 years - 0.4013 12.13 - 0.5343 21.42
Age> 50 years - 1.0754 38.09 - 1.1223 45.97
# children 0.1202 7.51 - 0.0921 7.72
Married 0.3759 13.05 0.1060 4.91
Vocational training - 0.7769 16.73 - 0.5597 17.55
("Teilfacharbeiter")
I Apprenticeship training - 0.2465 5.42 - 0.2430 6.02
("Facharbeiter")
Senior craftsman ("Meister") 0.0066 0.21 0.3560 6.23
Non-university graduate 0.1515 5.51 0.3862 17.25
("Fachschule")
University graduate - 0.0915 3.10 0.3353 10.51
Mecklenburg-Vorpommem - 0.1544 4.39 - 0.0476 1.59
Brandenburg - 0.1369 4.40 - 0.0313 1.10
Sachsen-Anhalt - 0.0754 2.47 - 0.0114 0.42
ThUringen - 0.0807 2.59 -0.1019 3.74
Berlin-East - 0.0618 1.48 - 0.0613 1.73
March 1991 - 0.1252 3.72 - 0.1151 3.94
July 1991 - 0.2670 7.78 1-0.2633 8.88
November 1991 - 0.3164 9.34 - 0.2915 9.78
July 1992 - 0.3942 11.39 - 0.4136 13.57
November 1992 - 0.4734 13.53 - 0:4422 14.21
LR statistics: X2(20) 2) 4334.45 - 5159.36
Pseudo R2 (McFadden) 3) 0.18 0.16
# Observations 21607 23956
Notes: 1) For those variables not defined in Table 1 the base categories are: 30::;; Age::;; 50 years
and "no educational or vocational training" 2) The LR statistics is twice the difference of the log
likelihood of the resticted and full model, respectively (degrees of freedom are in parantheses.
3) McFaddens Pseudo R2 is a simple transformation of this statistics with a range between 0 and 1.
Source: see Table 1.
16References
Akerlof. George A. et al. (1991): East Gennany in from the cold: the economic aftennath of
currency union; Brookings Papers on Economic Activity. 1991/1: 1-87.
Akerlof. George A. / Yellen. Janet L. (1990): The fair wage-effort hypothesis and unemployment;
Quarterly Journal of Economics. 105: 255-283.
Bellmann. Lutz (1992): Entlohnung in den neuen BundesHindem. Strukturelle Detenninanten der
Einkommensunterschiede aus den Daten des Arbeitsmarktmonitors; Mitteilungen aus der
Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung, 1/92: 27-31.
Bielenski. Harald et al. (1992): Arbeitsmarkt-Monitor fiir die neuen Bundesliinder. Eine Arbeits-
marktumfrage der Bundesanstalt fUr Arbeit: Zwischenbilanz und ausgewahlte Ergebnisse;
Mitteilungen aus der Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung, 2/92: 136-157.
Bird. Edward J. / Schwarze. Johannes / Wagner. Gert G. (1994): Wage effects of the move toward
free markets in East Gennany. Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 47. 3: 390-400.
Burda. Michael/Funke. Michael (1993): Gennan trade unions after unification - third degree wage
discriminating monopoli~s?; Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv•...• 547-560.
Franz. Wolfgang (1992): 1m Jahr danach - Bestandsaufnahme und Analyse der Arbeitsmarkt-
entwicklung in Ostdeutschland; in: B. Gahlen / H. Hesse / H.-J. Ramser (Hrsg.). Von der
Plan- zur Marktwirtschaft - Eine Zwischenbilanz; MOhr-Siebeck, Tiibingen.
Franz, Wolfgang (1993): Aus der Kiilte in die Arbeitslosigkeit - Eine Zwischenbilanz der ost-
deutschen Arbeitsmarktentwicklung; ZEW-Wirtschaftsanalysen, 1. Nr. 1: 4-23.
Geib. Thorsten / Lechner. Michael/Pfeiffer, FriedheIm / Salomon, Susanne (1992): Die Struktur der
Einkommensunterschiede in Ost- und Westdeutschland einJahrnach der Vereinigung; ZEW
Discussion Paper No 92-06. Mannheim.
Greene. William H. (1993): Econometric Analysis (2nd ed.), Macmillan. New York.
Harhoff, Dietmar / Stahl. Konrad (1994): Untemehmensentwicklung in den neuen Bundesliindem -
Erste empirische Ergebnisse; in: H. Konig / V. Steiner (Hrsg.), Arbeitsmarktdynamik und
Untemehmensentwicklung in Ostdeutschland; Schriftenreihe des ZEW, Band 1. Nomos
Verlagsgesellschaft. Baden-Baden.
Hsiao, Cheng (1986): Analysis of Panel Data; Econometric Society Monographs No. 11. Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge.
Katz. Lawrence F. (1986): Efficiency wage theories: a partial evaluation; in: S. Fischer (ed.), NBER
Macroeconomics Annual 1986; MIT Press. Cambridge, Mass.
Krueger, Alan B. / Pischke. Jam-Steffen (1992): A comparative analysis of East and West Gennan
labor markets before and after unification; ZEW Discussion Paper No 92-11, Mannheim.
Licht. Georg / Steiner, Viktor (1994): Where have all the workers gone? Employment tennination in
East Gennany after unification; in: J. Schwarze / F. Buttler / G. G. Wagner (eds.). Labour
Market Dynamics in Present Day Gennany, Campus / Westview.
Paque, Karl-Heinz (1993): East/west-wage rigidity in United Gennany: causes and consequences;
Kiel Working Paper No. 572, Kiel.
Pischke, Jam-Steffen / Staat. Matthias / Vogele. Stefan (1994): Arbeitslosigkeit, LOhne und Weiter-
biIdung: Warum pendeln Ostdeutsche in den Westen?; in: H. Konig / V. Steiner (Hrsg.),
Arbeitsmarktdynamik und Untemehrnensentwicklung in Ostdeutschland; Schriftenreihe des
ZEW. Band 1. Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden.
Sachversilindigenrat zur Begutachtung der gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung (1993): Zeit zum
Handeln -- Antriebskdifte starken. Jahresgutachten 1993/94; Metzler-Poeschel. Stuttgart.
Siebert, Horst (1992): Das Wagnis der Einheit. Eine wirtschaftspolitische Therapie; DVA, Stuttgart.
Sinn. Gerlinde / Sinn. Hans-Werner (1992), Kaltstart: VoIkswirtschaftliche Aspekte der deutschen
Vereinigung (2nd ed.), Mohr-Siebeck, Tiibingen.
17Steiner, Viktor (1993): Long-tenn unemployment during the tranSItion to a market economy -
Eastern Gennany after unification; ZEW Discussion Paper 93-14. Mannheim.
Schwarze, Johannes (1991): Ausbildung und Einkommen von Miinnern. Einkommensfunktions-
schiitzungen fur die ehemalige DDR und die Bundesrepublik Deutschland; Mitteilungen aus
der Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung. 1991/1: 63-69.
18